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Stoic logic assumes fi ve inference schemata attributed to Chrysippus of 
Soli. Those schemata are the well-known indemonstrables. A problem 
related to them can be that, according to standard propositional calcu-
lus, only one of them, modus ponens, is clearly indemonstrable. Never-
theless, I try to show in this paper that the mental logic theory enables to 
understand why the Stoics considered such schemata to be basic kinds 
of arguments. Following that theory, four of them can be linked to ‘Core 
Schemata’ of mental logic and the only one that is more controversial is 
modus tollens. However, as I also comment, some assumptions of Stoic 
philosophy, which can be interpreted from the mental logic theory, can 
explain why this last argument was included into the set of the indemon-
strables as well.
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Introduction
The basic arguments that, according to Stoic logic lead inferences are 
the fi ve indemonstrables: modus ponens, modus tollendo ponens, mo-
dus ponendo tollens (1), modus ponendo tollens (2), and modus tollens. 
Chrysippus of Soli is said to be the philosopher that identifi ed them. 
For example, Sextus Empiricus, in Adversus Mathematicos 8.223, 
states this fact. It is true that, as indicated by O’Toole and Jennings 
(2004), there is a certain discussion regarding this point. Nonetheless, 
what is important for this paper is that the Stoic idea seems to be that 
those fi ve schemata are rules that cannot be proved and that, however, 
serve to demonstrate all the other inferences.
Given that, according to standard propositional calculus, it is obvi-
ous that only one of them, modus ponens, is really indemonstrable, and 
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that the other four arguments can be derived by means of other rules 
of that calculus, one might ask why the Stoics considered the indemon-
strables to be so basic schemata. In my view, a contemporary theory on 
human reasoning can respond to that question. The theory is the men-
tal logic theory (e.g., Braine & O’Brien 1998a; O’Brien 2009; O’Brien & 
Manfrinati 2010). Following it, people reason by using a mental logic 
that is different to classical logic. Mental logic is not really in contradic-
tion with classical logic. In fact, all the valid inferences in mental logic 
are also valid in classical logic. The difference is that mental logic does 
not admit some formal rules of classical logic, and that, therefore, classi-
cal logic enables inferences that are not accepted in principle by mental 
logic. In this way, mental logic only considers the rules that, according 
to empirical research, individuals truly apply. Thus, it distinguishes 
different kinds of rules and describes the order and the circumstances 
in which such rules are used. However, what is more important here is 
that the mental logic theory claims that there are ‘Core Schemata’ in 
human mind that people always use when they reason about inferences 
with certain formal structures. Those Core Schemata are basic, since 
they only involve one step for fi nding a conclusion, and I think that the 
correspondences that can be found between Chrysippus’ indemonstra-
bles and the Core Schemata of mental logic can explain why the Stoics 
attributed a status so essential to the indemonstrables.
Thus, in this paper, I will try to show that four of the indemonstra-
bles, and not only modus ponens, can be considered to be really basic 
in the system proposed by the mental logic theory. The diffi cult points 
are only, as I will also indicate, that, while disjunctions are exclusive 
in Stoic logic, that is not necessarily the case in mental logic, and that, 
due to this fact, modus ponendo tollens (2) must be interpreted as a 
derived version of modus ponendo tollens (1).
As it will be also shown, the only problematic inference is modus 
tollens. As it is known, this rule is not a basic rule in standard proposi-
tional calculus or in systems such as that of Gentzen (1935). Nonethe-
less, this schema is problematic for the aims of this paper because, in 
the same way, cannot be linked to any Core Schema in mental logic. 
Besides, modus tollens causes many diffi culties in human reasoning 
research (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne 2002, and Espino & Byrne 
2013) and, as reported by cognitive science literature, individuals do 
not always apply it (see, e.g., Byrne and Johnson-Laird 2009, and 
López-Astorga 2013). In any case, I think that there are reasons that 
explain why the Stoics included it into the set of the indemonstrables. 
Such reasons are compatible with the theses of the mental logic theory 
and I will account for this idea below.
Nevertheless, before doing it, I will argue in favor of the thesis that 
mental logic allows considering four indemonstrables (all of them ex-
cept modus tollens) to be basic schemata. Each of the fi ve sections of 
this paper hence addresses one indemonstrable. I will begin by the sim-
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plest one, i.e., modus ponens, and fi nish with the most complex one, i.e., 
modus tollens.
Modus ponens
Modus ponens is an argument in which the fi rst premise is a condi-
tional ἀξίωμα. This Greek word is often translated as ‘proposition’. Al-
though I am aware that the exact meaning of the word is discussed 
(see, e.g., O’Toole & Jennings 2004), for simplicity I will adopt that 
translation in the following pages. The Stoics usually expressed modus 
ponens in this way:
“If the fi rst, the second;
but the fi rst;
therefore, the second” (O’Toole & Jennings 2004: 476).
Its formal structure hence is as follows:
x → y, x // Ergo y
Where ‘→’ stands for conditional relationship.
In my view, it is obvious that modus ponens is a basic and essential 
reasoning rule. That is evident in Gentzen’s system and in standard 
propositional calculus. In addition, it is a Core Schema, schema 7, in 
the description of mental logic proposed by Braine and O’Brien (1998b). 
So, it can be said that it is a schema that people use where possible. 
Likewise, its importance is also clear for axiomatic systems, both those 
based on classical logic and those based on non-classical logics. Fur-
thermore, its structure is quite simple. Given a conditional proposition, 
if the ἡγούμενον, that is, the antecedent (or, in the previous quote, ‘the 
fi rst’) happens, then the λῆγον, that is, the consequent (or, in the previ-
ous quote, ‘the second’) must happen as well. Because these facts, it is 
not surprising that the Stoics thought that modus ponens is an inde-
monstrable. Indeed, it seems that they really were right.
Modus tollendo ponens
In this case, the fi rst premise is a disjunctive proposition. The argu-
ment was often expressed in the following way:
“Either the fi rst or the second;
but not the fi rst;
therefore, the second” (O’Toole & Jennings, 2004: 476).
Thus, its formal structure is:
x ∨ y, ¬x // Ergo y
Where ‘∨’ means disjunction and ‘¬’ represents denial.
As it can be noted, the rule is that, if one of the disjuncts of a particu-
lar disjunction is denied, then the other disjunct must be correct. The 
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problem of this inference is that it can be demonstrated in standard 
propositional calculus. The derivation could be this one:
  [1] x ∨ y (premise)
  [2] ¬x (premise)
  [3] x (assumption)
  [4] ¬y (assumption)
  [5] x · ¬x (·I 2, 3)
  [6] ¬¬y (RA 4–5)
  [7] y (¬E 6)
  [8] y (assumption)
  [9] y (reiteration 8)
[10] y (∨E 1, 3–7, 8–9)
Where ‘·’ is conjunction, ‘·I’ refers to the conjunction introduction rule 
(x, y // Ergo x · y), ‘RA’ represents the Reductio ad Absurdum strategy 
(if x is supposed and a contradiction such as y · ¬y is found, then ¬x 
must be drawn), ‘¬E’ denotes the denial elimination rule (¬¬x // Ergo 
x), and ‘vE’ stands for the disjunction elimination rule (x ∨ y, x → z, y 
→ z // Ergo z).
Ten steps are many steps and one might think that they do not de-
scribe the real process that human mind makes in arguments in which 
modus tollendo ponens is involved. However, although this deduction 
is truly complex in mental logic, it is not absolutely impossible in it. 
The derivation includes rules that are schemata in mental logic. ·I 
is a Feeder Schema, in particular, schema 8 in Braine and O’Brien’s 
(1998b) system. A Feeder Schema is not a Core Schema. Nevertheless, 
Feeder Schemata play an important role in mental logic, since they are 
used when they can offer relevant information that enables to use other 
rule. On the other hand, ¬E is a Core Schema in that same system, in 
particular, schema 1 in Braine and O’Brien’s (1998b) description.
The diffi culties are linked to Reductio ad Absurdum and vE. Re-
ductio ad Absurdum is, certainly, a strategy enabled by mental logic. 
Nonetheless, it does not take part in the ‘Direct Reasoning Routine’. 
It is an ‘Indirect Reasoning Strategy’ and, for this reason, it is hard to 
use and it is not always applied. This is a real problem because in the 
previous derivation Reductio ad Absurdum is used two times. Besides, 
it can be thought that other controversial point related to Reductio ad 
Absurdum is that, from other perspectives, it is argued that the logi-
cal systems allowing resorting to Reductio ad Absurdum do not really 
describe human reasoning, since contradictions enable to conclude any 
proposition in formal logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird 2010). The idea seems 
to be that contradictions or incompatibilities, i.e., cases of x · ¬x, are 
not only linked in logic to Reductio ad Absurdum, but also to the Ex 
Contradictione Quodlibet principle. However, I think that this criti-
cism is only opportune for a theory claiming that human beings reason 
following classical logic, standard propositional calculus or systems 
such as that of Gentzen (1935). Indeed, in those cases, any formula 
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can be supposed and, if it causes a contradiction, its negation can be 
drawn. Nevertheless, in mental logic incompatibilities only refer to Re-
ductio ad Absurdum, and not to Ex Contradictione Quodlibet. In this 
last logic, any proposition cannot be assumed. A proposition can only 
be supposed if it can be true, and “Nothing follows from a contradiction 
except that some assumption is wrong” (Braine & O’Brien 1998c: 206). 
Therefore, based on mental logic, criticisms such as this one are not 
true problems. The diffi culties are facts such as those indicated, i.e., 
the fact that Reductio ad Absurdum is hard to apply, the fact that it is 
not often used, and the fact that the previous deduction requires it to 
be applied two times.
As far as vE is concerned, it can be said that there is a Core Schema 
in mental logic that can correspond to it. That schema is schema 5 in 
Braine and O’Brien (1998b) and can be expressed, with other symbols, 
as follows:
x1 ∨…∨ xn, x1 → y,…, xn → y // Ergo y
There is no doubt that this schema is very akin to vE. The problem is 
that, in modus tollendo ponens, the premises x1 → y,…, xn → y do not 
appear. They need to be made in some way (steps 3–7 and 8–9 in the 
previous deduction), and, undoubtedly, this means an additional effort.
It is hence evident that, although the system presented by Braine 
and O’Brien (1998b) allows proving modus tollendo ponens, that deduc-
tion is very hard to do in their system, and, according to the general 
theses and predictions of the mental logic theory, such a demonstration 
is very unlikely to be done. Regardless the fact that human reasoning 
does not seem to make inferences with so many steps in an automatic 
way, the empirical results reported in Braine and O’Brien (1998b) and 
in Braine, Reiser, and Rumain (1998) suggest that modus tollendo pon-
ens is a simple and basic rule that only requires one step to be applied 
(that is, that people tend to infer y directly from x v y and ¬x). Indi-
viduals appear to solve reasoning problems involving modus tollendo 
ponens very quickly and, in addition, the percentage of errors in this 
kind of problems is very low. In this way, it can be thought that, for 
these reasons, mental logic assumes that the following argument is a 
Core Schema:
x1 ∨…∨ xn, ¬xi // Ergo x1 ∨…∨ xi–1 ∨ xi+1 ∨…∨ xn
Indeed, Braine and O’Brien (1998b) state that a schema similar to this 
one (with other symbols) is clearly a Core Schema of mental logic (in 
particular, it is their Core Schema 3) whose percentage of errors is 
only 2,5%. It is obvious that this schema corresponds to modus tollendo 
ponens and the fact that it can be considered to be a basic Core Schema 
enables to understand why the Stoics thought that it is an indemon-
strable. As said, maybe modus tollendo ponens could be demonstrated 
in mental logic system. However, empirical evidence and experimental 
results indicate that it is usually applied in a rapid way, and that it is 
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a schema naturally used by human beings.
Modus ponendo tollens (1)
In the version 1 of modus ponendo tollens, the fi rst premise is a denied 
proposition. In particular, it is a denied conjunction. It was often ex-
pressed as follows:
“Not both the fi rst and the second;
but the fi rst;
therefore, not the second” (O’Toole & Jennings 2004: 476).
So, the logical form of this inference could be:
¬(p · q), p // Ergo ¬q
Modus ponendo tollens (1) is an inference that can be proved in stan-
dard propositional calculus as well. The derivation could be the follow-
ing:
[1] ¬(x · y) (premise)
[2] x (premise)
[3] y (assumption)
[4] x · y (·I 2, 3)
[5] ¬(x · y) · (x · y) (·I 1, 4)
[6] ¬y (RA 3–5)
Again, in principle, it could be thought that the system proposed by 
Braine and O’Brien (1998b) allows demonstrating modus ponendo tol-
lens (1) and that, therefore, it is not a basic rule. ·I is a Feeder Schema 
in mental logic and Reductio ad Absurdum is a possible strategy in that 
same logic. Nevertheless, as said, mental logic considers Reductio ad 
Absurdum to be a complex strategy that is not always used and that is 
not applied by every individual. In this way, it seems that, when rea-
soners face to premises such as ¬(x · y) and x, they resort to a simple 
schema that allows them to derive ¬y. The empirical results reported by 
Braine and O’Brien (1998b) and Braine et al. (1998) suggest that this 
is the case and that people do not really follow the previous six steps. 
Because of such results, other mental logic Core Schema—schema 4 in 
Braine and O’Brien (1998b)—has a form similar to this one:
¬(x1 ·…· xn), xi // Ergo ¬(x1 ·…· xi–1 · xi+1 ·…· xn)
It is not hard to note that modus ponendo tollens (1) can be directly 
related to this Core Schema, which, according to Braine and O’Brien 
(1998b) has an error rate of 4%. It hence is also clear why modus ponen-
do tollens (1) is an indemonstrable in Stoic Logic.
Modus ponendo tollens (2)
Again the fi rst premise is a disjunction. The problem now is that the 
disjunction is exclusive. The usual wording of modus ponendo tollens 
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(2) is this one:
“Either the fi rst or the second;
but the fi rst;
therefore, not the second” (O’Toole & Jennings 2004: 476).
Obviously, this argument is only valid if its disjunction is exclusive. 
Thus, its formal structure could be as follows:
x v y, x // Ergo ¬y
Where ‘v’ stands for exclusive disjunction.
But it can be stated that disjunction is exclusive in modus ponendo tol-
lens (2) not only because, according classical logic, its formal structure 
requires it, but also because it seems that all disjunctions are exclusive 
in Stoic logic. We have some testimonies in this regard (most of them 
mentioned by O’Toole & Jennings 2004). For example, Gellius, speak-
ing about disjunctions, in Noctes Atticae 16.8, states that “Ex omnibus, 
quae disiunguntur, unum esse verum debet, falsa cetera”. It is abso-
lutely clear that what Gellius means is that, in a particular disjunction, 
only one disjunct can be true. All the other disjuncts must be false. 
Other example can be taken from Galen, who, in Institutio Logica 5.1, 
says the same idea again, i.e., that “… τῶν διεζευγμένων εν μόνον ἔξόντων 
ἄληθές,…”, that is, that, in disjunctions, only one disjunct is true. Of 
course, more examples can be offered, but I think that these two ex-
amples are representative enough to understand the Stoic view about 
disjunctions.
In any case, the fact that the Stoics consider all disjunctions to be 
exclusive can be, in principle, problematic because disjunctions are in-
clusive in systems such as standard propositional calculus. Neverthe-
less, as it is known, the problem disappears if we take the following 
equivalence into account:
(x ∨ y) = (x ∨ y) · ¬(x · y)
Certainly, standard propositional calculus can work with exclusive dis-
junctions by virtue of this equivalence. Thus, it can be said that modus 
ponendo tollens (2) is not also indemonstrable in classical logic. The 
derivation can be this one:
[1] (x ∨ y) · ¬(x · y) (premise)
[2] x (premise)
[3] ¬(x · y) (·E 1)
[4] …
Where ‘·E’ is the conjunction elimination rule (x · y // Ergo x).
From step 4 on, the deduction is the same as that of the previous section, 
i.e., as that of the modus ponendo tollens (1). So, the same arguments 
and criticisms could be repeated here. Nonetheless, I think that the 
points that are important to comment in this case are the following:
On the one hand, if disjunctions are always exclusive in Stoic logic, 
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it could be thought that this fact affects modus tollendo ponens too. 
However, this is not a problem, since, as it can be noted, it does not 
matter whether the disjunction in modus tollendo ponens is inclusive 
or exclusive. The arguments and comments indicated in the corre-
sponding section continue to be valid even if the disjunction of the fi rst 
premise of modus tollendo ponens is exclusive.
On the other hand, the equivalence (x ∨ y) = (x ∨ y) · ¬(x · y) can 
be assumed in mental logic as well. This assumption would not cause 
diffi culties to the mental logic theory. In this theory, ·E is other Feeder 
Schema and, therefore, there need be no additional problems in this 
way. The only aspect that would have to be highlighted is that the 
mental logic theory would not accept deductions as large as that corre-
sponding to the derivation in classical logic of ¬y from [(x ∨ y) · ¬(x · y)] 
and x. According to mental logic, in the previous deduction, reasoners 
would apply schema 4 and, in step 4, would draw ¬y. So, mental logic 
schema 4 and the previous equivalence not only allow understanding 
why the Stoics thought that modus ponendo tollens (2) was an inde-
monstrable too, but also why modi ponendo tollens (1) and (2) are so 
linked. Both of them refer to the logical form ¬(x · y) and hence to a 
Core Schema, schema 4, in the system proposed by Braine and O’Brien 
(1998b).
Modus tollens
This is the indemonstrable that is more diffi cult to explain because, as 
mentioned, cognitive science literature shows that people do not often 
make this inference correctly. Its usual expression is this one:
 “If the fi rst, the second;
but not the second;
therefore, not the fi rst.” 
  (O’Toole & Jennings 2004: 476).
Its logical form hence is as follows:
x → y, ¬y // Ergo ¬x
Given that modus tollens can be proved in standard propositional cal-
culus and does not correspond to any Core Schema or to any schema of 
other type in mental logic, it can be argued that, by considering it to be 
one of the fi ve indemonstrables, the Stoics made a mistake. However, it 
can also be thought that the Stoics had any reason to adopt modus tol-
lens, and the aim of this section is to check whether or not that reason 
can be found.
As it is well known, modus tollens is not a basic rule in standard 
propositional calculus and its conclusion must be derived by means 
of several steps. The usual inferential process attributed to it is akin 
to this one (see, for example, Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009, or López-
Astorga, 2013):
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[1] x → y (premise)
[2] ¬y (premise)
[3] x (assumption)
[4] y (MP 1, 3)
[5] y · ¬y (·I 2, 4)
[6] ¬x (RA 3–5)
Where ‘MP’ means ‘modus ponens’.
Thus, it is clear that, following classical logic, modus tollens is a de-
rived rule and is not as basic as, for example, modus ponens (which, 
as it can be noted, needs to be used in the deduction corresponding to 
modus tollens). The problem in this case is, as said, that is not even a 
schema in mental logic. The inference is, of course, possible in mental 
logic, but, as in the case of standard propositional calculus, it depends 
on Reductio ad Absurdum and modus ponens, which means that it is 
an inference that is hard to apply and less frequent than others. One 
might ask why the Stoics thought that it is one of the indemonstrables 
and so basic.
It appears that the Stoics analyzed problems such as this one, since 
they were very concerned with the criteria that conditional proposi-
tions had to fulfi ll. Perhaps, they already noted that people do not al-
ways use modus tollens and offered a solution. Nevertheless, if we pay 
attention to ancient sources, it seems that their solution was related 
to the characteristics that a proposition needed to have to be consid-
ered as a conditional, and not to the indemonstrables themselves. In 
this way, one might suppose that the idea was that modus tollens was 
only applied when the fi rst premise of the argument was really a con-
ditional. If that was not the case, modus tollens was not used. This is 
my hypothesis and it is based on criteria such as that mentioned by 
Diogenes Laërtius at 7.73: “συνημμένον οὖν ἀληθές ἐστιν οὗ τὸ ἀντικείμενον 
τοῦ λήγοντος μάχεται τῷ ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστι.’” What Dio-
genes Laërtius indicates is that an actual relation between the ante-
cedent (ἡγούμενον) and the consequent (λῆγον) is needed. As I interpret 
this quote, without that relation, it is not possible to state that the 
proposition is a real conditional. Thus, it can be understood that the 
Stoic criterion is that, if the consequent is denied, the antecedent must 
denied too. O’Toole and Jennings’ (2004) thesis on this point is very 
illustrative. According to them, the key seems to be the translation of 
the word ‘μάχεται’, which is interpreted as ‘confl icts’ and refers to “some 
degree of common content” (O’Toole & Jennings 2004: 492) between the 
two clauses of conditional.
Undoubtedly, Diogenes Laërtius’ example at 7.73, i.e., ‘If it is day, 
it is light’ (O’Toole & Jennings’ 2004, translation) is very clear. If it is 
not light, then necessarily it is not day. Therefore, it can be said that, 
according to the Stoics, a conditional such as x → y is a real conditional 
only when it is also true that ¬y → ¬x. So, it appears that modus tol-
lens is applied only when this last requirement is fulfi lled. Equally, 
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from this perspective, it is obvious the reason why modus tollens is 
not used in some cases. When the relation between the antecedent and 
the consequent is random, the use of modus tollens is not secured. For 
example, in the proposition ‘If I wear white trousers, then I wear red 
shoes’, there is no an evident relation between the then-clause and the 
if-clause. The fact that I do not wear red shoes does not necessarily in-
volve that I do not wear white trousers. However, in Diogenes Laërtius’ 
example, the situation is different. If it is not light, as said, then neces-
sarily it is not day. In this last case, modus tollens can be applied in a 
rapid and automatic way and without effort. Nevertheless, in the case 
of the white trousers and the red shoes, it is obviously harder to use.
It can be thought that the Stoics were considering cases similar 
to those in which an invited inference can be found (Geis & Zwicky 
1971) or in which the phenomenon of conditional perfection happens 
(e.g., Auwera 1997a, 1997b; Horn 2000; López-Astorga 2014; Moldovan 
2009), that is, cases in which the conditional leads to propositions such 
as ¬x → ¬y or it is transformed into a biconditional. As it is well known, 
when a conditional such as x – > y is perfected, it is transformed into 
(x → y) · (y → x), or, if preferred, into x ↔ y. Of course, this could be an 
interesting idea, since, for example, a perfected conditional leads one 
to think that only two scenarios are possible: a scenario in which both 
x and y are true, and a scenario in which both x and y are false. Thus, 
if the fi rst premise is x ↔ y and the second one is ¬y, it is clearer that 
only one option is possible: ¬x.
However, I think that the explanation that can be offered from the 
mental logic theory is simpler and has a more evident link to Diogenes 
Laërtius’ previous quote. In mental logic, modus tollens is not, as in-
dicated, an accepted schema. Nonetheless, the mental logic theory can 
explain why this rule is applied without diffi culties in certain cases. 
The theory admits that pragmatics plays an important role in human 
inferential processes (Braine & O’Brien, 1998d) and, therefore, that 
pragmatics can provide information, i.e., some premise, which is not 
explicitly mentioned in the inference. In this way, it can be stated that 
modus tollens is only easily used when pragmatics refers to a premise 
such as ¬y → ¬x. Thus, if Diogenes Laërtius’ example were the fi rst 
premise in a modus tollens inference, the true deduction could be as 
follows:
[1] x → y (premise)
[2] ¬y (premise)
[3] ¬y → ¬x (pragmatic premise)
[4] ¬x (MP 2, 3)
Step 3 indicates that reasoners, by virtue of their general knowledge, 
know that if it is not light, then it cannot be day. And this last pragmat-
ic premise allows deriving, by means of a simple application of modus 
ponens, ¬x in step 4.
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So, it can be said that the Stoics considered modus tollens to be an 
indemonstrable because they thought that it could only be used with 
real conditionals, i.e., with relations between x and y involving both x 
→ y and ¬y → ¬x. Based on the mental logic theory, however, it is not 
necessary to distinguish between real and false conditionals. When a 
conditional refers to a pragmatic premise such as ¬y → ¬x, modus tol-
lens appears to be used without effort. Nevertheless, what really hap-
pens is that the pragmatic premise allows applying modus ponens. It is 
evident that, if this last argument is accepted, it is easy to understand 
why the Stoics assumed that modus tollens was an indemonstrable. 
Although both accounts—that of Stoic logic and that of mental logic—
are different, both of them share an important idea: the reference to ¬y 
→ ¬x is needed to directly derive ¬x from x → y and ¬y. Without that 
reference, modus tollens is problematic because it can be thought that 
the conditional is not a true conditional (Stoic logic) or that ¬x cannot 
be concluded by means of just one or two simple steps (mental logic). 
The proponents of the mental logic theory could hence state that the 
propositions that the Stoics took as real conditionals are actually con-
ditionals that refer to a pragmatic premise such as ¬y → ¬x.
But it is also interesting that, from frameworks such as Stoic logic 
and mental logic, other problems related to modus tollens comment-
ed in cognitive science literature can be solved as well. For example, 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) and Espino and Byrne (2013) men-
tion inferences with the formal structure of modus tollens in which 
¬x is never concluded. Such inferences often have a fi rst premise, i.e., 
the premise corresponding to the conditional proposition, which can be 
considered to be diffi cult or controversial. A clear case of premise of this 
kind is this one:
“If Rachel is in Brazil she is not in Rio” (Espino & Byrne 2013: 102).
If an argument of modus tollens with this proposition as its fi rst prem-
ise is thought, the conclusion that is derived is hard to accept. In par-
ticular, the inference would be as follows:
[1] If Rachel is in Brazil, then she is not in Rio (premise)
[2] Rachel is in Rio (premise)
[3] Rachel is not in Brazil (MT 1, 2)
Obviously, ‘MT’ means ‘modus tollens’.
As it can be noted, steps 2 and 3 are absolutely incompatible, since it is 
not possible to be in Rio and not to be in Brazil. According to Stoic logic, 
the solution of this problem is evident: the denial of the consequent 
(she is in Rio) does not involve the denial of the antecedent (Rachel 
is not in Brazil). So, the fi rst premise is not an actual conditional and 
modus tollens cannot be applied.
Nevertheless, following mental logic, the solution is also obvious. 
There is a pragmatic premise, but that premise is not y → ¬x (the an-
tecedent of this last formula is y, and not ¬y, because the consequent 
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of the fi rst premise states that she is not in Rio and hence is denied), 
which explains why modus tollens is not immediately applied. The true 
pragmatic premise is in this case y → x (i.e., ‘If Rachel is in Rio, then 
she is in Brazil’), since, as said, a situation in which Rachel is in Rio 
and is not in Brazil cannot be thought. Therefore, based on the mental 
logic theory, it can be argued that the actual inferential process would 
be this one:
[1] x → ¬y (premise)
[2] y (premise)
[3] y → x (pragmatic premise)
[4] x (MP 2, 3)
As shown in step 4, a simple application of modus ponens leads reason-
ers to conclude that Rachel is in Brazil. And this shows why it is so 
unusual that ¬x (Rachel is not in Brazil) is drawn in this type of infer-
ences. Obviously, the process could continue and, in step 5, ¬y could be 
inferred from steps 1 and 4 by means of modus ponens. Nonetheless, in 
that case, a contradiction (steps 2 and 5) would be found, which would 
indicate that a premise is false (for example, that of step 1).
In any case, what is important is that, as explained in the previous 
pages, the mental logic theory enables to understand the reasons that 
leaded the Stoics to state that the fi ve arguments reviewed—modus 
ponens, modus tollendo ponens, modus ponendo tollens (1), modus 
ponendo tollens (2), and modus tollens—were indemonstrable. Four 
of them are demonstrable in standard propositional calculus, but, as 
claimed by the mental logic theory, people do not reason paying atten-
tion to the principles and rules of classical logic.
Conclusions
As commented above, only modus ponens seems to be an indisputable 
basic schema, since it is so in standard propositional calculus. Modus 
tollendo ponens, the two versions of modus ponendo tollens, and modus 
tollens can be proved in that calculus. However, given that modus tol-
lendo ponens, modus ponendo tollens (1), and modus ponendo tollens 
(2) are Core Schemata in mental logic, the only problem appears to be 
modus tollens.
Indeed, if we assume that human mind does not follow classical 
logic, but mental logic, it is not diffi cult to understand why the Sto-
ics considers the fi rst four arguments (all but modus tollens) to be so 
basic. Nevertheless, this last idea requires two points to be taken into 
account. Firstly, it is true that disjunctions are exclusive in Stoic logic. 
Nonetheless, exclusive disjunctions are possible in mental logic. It is 
only necessary to attribute to them the logical form (x ∨ y) · ¬(x · y). 
This logical form makes the two versions of modus ponendo tollens very 
similar and allows one to note that they really refer to the same schema 
in mental logic (schema 4 in Braine & O’Brien 1998b). Secondly, as far 
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as modus tollendo ponens is concerned, it does not matter whether dis-
junction is exclusive or inclusive. The corresponding schema (schema 3 
in Braine & O’Brien, 1998b) can be used without diffi culties both when 
it is exclusive and when it is inclusive.
Therefore, as mentioned, the only controversial indemonstrable is 
modus tollens. However, as also commented, it is not hard to under-
stand why it is an important argument for the Stoics. According to 
them, an actual conditional is that in which there is a clear link be-
tween the antecedent and the consequent, and in which ¬y is obviously 
incompatible with x. In this way, from the perspective of mental logic, 
what Stoic logic claims is that a conditional is only true if it is linked to 
a pragmatic premise with the logical form ¬y → ¬x. Thus, it seems that 
modus tollens is applied, but the schema that is really used is modus 
ponens. So, because it is very easy to deduce ¬x from x → y, ¬y, and ¬y 
→ ¬x, the reasons why the Stoics assumed that modus tollens was an 
indemonstrable are evident.
In this way, we can think about an extension of mental logic includ-
ing modus tollens. The idea would be to consider modus tollens to be 
a valid schema provided that ¬y is incompatible or inconsistent with 
x, i.e., provided that the Stoics’ requirement is fulfi lled. Nevertheless, 
the mental logic system described in Braine and O’Brien (1998a) does 
not need to assume this new rule. That system admits that pragmatic 
premises play a role in human reasoning, and that, as indicated, if ¬y 
→ ¬x is accepted as a pragmatic premise in an inference with the logi-
cal structure of modus tollens, just modus ponens (which is schema 7 
in Braine & O’Brien 1998b) must be applied for drawing ¬x. From this 
point of view, to add this new rule would only make the mental logic 
system unnecessarily more complex, without giving it more predictive 
or explicative scope.
In any case, paying attention to the Stoics again, it can be said that 
they were aware that the material interpretation of conditional is prob-
lematic. According to that interpretation, if the antecedent of a condi-
tional is false, it is absolutely guaranteed that the conditional in en-
tirety is true. Therefore, a proposition such as ‘if elephants can fl y, then 
human beings are oviparous’ is necessarily true, since it is false that 
elephants can fl y. Maybe cases such as this one leaded the Stoics to as-
sume their criterion indicated by Diogenes Laërtius at 7.73. Following 
that criterion, the previous conditional would not be a real conditional. 
The reason is that the fact that human beings are not oviparous does 
not have any link or relation to the possibility that elephants can fl y. 
The proponents of mental logic also noted these diffi culties and rejected 
the material interpretation of conditional as well. Based on the mental 
logic theory, it cannot be stated that human beings reason considering 
the traditional truth tables (which, as it is well known, are consistent 
with the material interpretation). Human reasoning follows syntactic 
rules, and, in particular, the syntactic schemata that experimental re-
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sults reveal (not all the rules of calculi such as standard propositional 
calculus). Undoubtedly, this is an important point, and, given that both 
an ancient theory (Stoic logic) and a current theory (mental logic) agree 
on it, it can be worth continuing to take this thesis into account.
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